Apple ATTF:
Data Protection for
Its Own Benefit?
Apple ATTF:
Data Protection for
Its Own Benefit?
of
Should a platform with significant market power be allowed to make it easier for users to consent to its own advertising offerings than to those of its competitors? And where is the line between legitimate data protection and anti-competitive self-preferencing? The Federal Cartel Office has addressed both questions in its proceedings against Apple’s App Tracking Transparency Framework.
Two prompt windows for the same question
With the so-called App Tracking Transparency Framework (ATTF), Apple has introduced guidelines for third-party app providers on iPhones and iPads. For certain forms of cross-company data sharing, third-party providers were required to obtain additional consent—in addition to consent under data protection laws—via a prompt window specified by Apple.
These requirements did not apply to Apple’s own services. The company used its own, separately designed pop-up window to obtain consent for personalized advertising within its own ecosystem.
According to the Federal Cartel Office’s preliminary assessment, the language, design, and options offered in Apple’s own services might be more likely to prompt users to consent, while the same elements in apps from other providers would make it more difficult for users to consent. In addition, some app publishers would have had to obtain consent multiple times, even if valid consent under data protection law had already been given.
Data protection standards or competitive advantage?
During the proceedings, Apple argued that the ATTF serves to protect users’ privacy and is a measure that complies with competition law, one that also allows the company to differentiate itself from the competition by offering a particularly high level of data protection.
The trade associations representing the trademark, media, and advertising industries, which were joined as parties to the proceedings, take the opposite position. In their view, Apple—as a gatekeeper with significant market power—should not be allowed to impose any additional, “extra-legal” rules if doing so would restrict other companies’ business activities. The Federal Cartel Office had to resolve this fundamental conflict between data protection arguments and competition law considerations.
Federal Cartel Office Declares Apple’s Commitments Binding
The Federal Cartel Office had initiated the proceedings in June 2022 and notified Apple and the associations involved of its preliminary legal assessment in February 2025. Apple subsequently offered commitments, which the Office subjected to a market test in December 2025. Following further adjustments, the Federal Cartel Office has now declared the commitments binding in its decision dated August 13, 2026—Ref. No. B7-54/25— and has thereby concluded the proceedings.
Important for context: This is neither an injunction nor a fine proceeding. Apple continues to believe that its existing rules comply with competition law and has merely offered voluntary commitments, which the agency has declared binding. This does not constitute a formal finding of a violation of antitrust law.
The legal basis was the special oversight of abusive practices by large digital corporations under the Act Against Restraints of Competition, in conjunction with the European prohibition on abusive practices set forth in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Federal Cartel Office had already determined in April 2023 that Apple plays a dominant role across markets in terms of competition. The Federal Court of Justice confirmed this finding in March 2025.
Why the dual role as a distribution platform and advertising provider was decisive
Through its operating systems and the App Store, Apple controls a key infrastructure for the distribution of apps. At the same time, the company itself offers apps and advertising space. According to the Federal Cartel Office, this dual role gives rise to specific competition-related requirements.
Andreas Mundt, President of the Federal Cartel Office, summed up the core of the concerns. While Apple is permitted to establish rules that are stricter than those required by law, it must not
not to give its own products or services preferential treatment over those of its competitors.
Can a higher level of protection come at the expense of competition?
That is the question at the very heart of the competition law aspects of this case. The Federal Cartel Office’s response is nuanced. Even a company with significant market power is, in principle, permitted to take measures to protect the privacy of its users that go beyond the minimum legal requirements. A higher level of data protection is therefore not, in and of itself, a competition law issue.
Rather, the decisive factor for the Agency was whether this level of protection was symmetrical—that is, whether it applied in a comparable manner to both its own and third-party offerings. According to the Federal Cartel Office’s assessment, the differences between the two search windows went beyond what could have been justified by different forms of data processing. Data protection can thus serve as a differentiating factor in competition, but not as a covert instrument for unilaterally favoring one’s own offerings.
What’s Changing for App Providers and Advertisers
With these commitments now in effect, Apple is aligning the prompt windows for its own offerings and those of other providers much more closely in terms of content, language, and design. Intimidating symbols and phrasing in the prompt provided by Apple for third-party providers have been removed.
App publishers and content providers, such as media publishers, will also have more opportunities to explain to users the importance of personalized advertising for their offerings and business models. The previously complex consent request process for third-party providers will be simplified. In particular, app publishers will have more options to combine the prompt required by Apple with the consent prompt required under data protection law, or to clearly link the two in a way that is understandable to users. Advertisers and technical service providers in the advertising industry can also benefit from these improved conditions.
A clear timeline applies to the implementation. Apple has four months from the date the decision is served to implement the promised changes and will test them together with app publishers before implementation. The commitments themselves are valid for seven years and will be monitored by an independent monitoring trustee.
Context: Another building block in the oversight of Gatekeeper’s potential misuse
This decision is part of a series of proceedings by the Federal Cartel Office against major digital corporations, which have been based on the special abuse of dominance regulations since their introduction. Other European competition authorities have also conducted proceedings regarding the ATTF, some with different outcomes. Last year, the French and Italian competition authorities imposed fines of 150 million and 98.6 million euros, respectively, on Apple, rather than opting for a commitment-based settlement.
Throughout the proceedings, the Federal Cartel Office states that it maintained close communication with the other European authorities and the European Commission within the European Competition Network. In the Office’s assessment, the solution now reached could also influence the future structure of the ATTF in other member states. Whether this expectation will be fulfilled is a forecast by the Office and, so far, nothing more than that.
Conclusion
A higher level of data protection is not, in and of itself, suspicious under antitrust law, even for a provider with market power. It becomes problematic only when this level of protection is designed unilaterally to favor the provider’s own offerings, thereby hindering competitors. For companies with a “gatekeeper” position as defined under the special abuse control provisions, this is a relevant guideline for their own product design.
It remains unclear to what extent this guidance is actually binding on third parties. Since this is a commitment decision and Apple continues to deny any violation, there is no formal finding of an antitrust violation. It is therefore unclear whether—and to what extent—affected app providers or advertisers can rely on the Federal Cartel Office’s preliminary assessment to support their own claims.
It also remains to be seen whether the seven-year oversight by the Monitoring Trustee will be sufficient to prevent any renewed, creeping preferential treatment. Following the market test of the original commitments, the industry associations that were joined as third parties had initially demanded a formal prohibition order with a fine and only accepted the revised commitments as a result. Whether the solution now agreed upon will actually address their concerns will only become clear once it is implemented in practice.
We’d be happy to
you on
Data protection law!
